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Political and government connections on corporate boards in 
Australia: Good for business?  
 
Abstract 
International studies suggest that directors with political connections provide significant 
benefits to shareholders. Yet, whether this is the case in the political and business 
environment in Australia is unknown. In this study, we examine the prevalence of former 
politicians as non-executive directors in ASX-listed companies and the market reaction to 
their appointment. In our sample of 1,561 companies in 2007, we find that former federal, 
state, local and foreign politicians hold directorships in 5.32% of firms. Our event study 
of new director appointments shows that the market reaction to the appointment of 
former politicians is significantly lower than non-politicians. This indicates that 
shareholders do not value the expertise that former politicians bring to corporate boards 
in Australia, particularly when their political parties are not in power and when they have 
less political and director experience. In summary, we find no evidence that former 
politician directors possess valuable political connections in Australia. 
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Introduction 
Following their terms in office, several high-profile politicians have obtained 
directorships in Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) listed companies. This includes a 
former prime minister (Keating), leaders of the opposition (e.g. Hewson, Peacock) and 
state premiers (e.g. Borbidge, Brown, Goss, Greiner, Kennett, Wran). The results of 
international studies suggest that directors with political connections can provide 
significant benefits to shareholders (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Faccio, 2006; 
Goldman et al., 2009; Hillman, 2005). However, how many former politicians hold 
directorships in ASX-listed companies and whether shareholders value the expertise that 
politicians bring to boards of directors in the political and business environment in 
Australia is unknown.  
 Prior studies of corporate boards in Australia have focused on the independence, 
financial expertise, gender, experience and interlocking directorships of directors (Adams 
et al., 2011; Aldamen et al., 2012; Balatbat et al., 2004; Christensen et al., 2010; Cotter 
and Silvester, 2003; Gray and Nowland, 2013; Kiel and Nicholson, 2006; Wang and 
Oliver, 2009). Further examination of the types of expertise present on corporate boards 
is needed to ensure boards “comprise directors possessing an appropriate range of skills 
and expertise” (ASX 2010, page 19). Since a number of recent media articles have 
highlighted the existence (and questioned the usefulness) of former politicians as 
corporate directors in Australia, this study focuses on this specific type of director 
expertise.
1
  
                                                 
1 “Profile: From cabinet to boardroom” in Company Director Magazine, 1 December 2011; “Downer, 
Brumby join Huawei board” in The Northern Star, 6 June 2011; “Parliament may back ban on former 
politicians serving on boards” in The Australian, 23 November 2010; “Life after politics” in Company 
Director Magazine, 1 August 2008. 
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International studies have examined the benefits and costs to firms of political 
connections in different markets, such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and the 
United States. Theoretically, Hillman (2005) proposes that directors with political 
experience can help firms to better understand the public policy process, provide a direct 
channel to existing politicians, bureaucrats and decision makers that may result in 
influence over political decisions, and provide legitimacy by associating their reputation 
and status with the firm. Empirically, studies show that firms generally benefit from 
political connections as they help firms to win government contracts and concessions, 
and access external financing (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Backman, 2001; Claessens et 
al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Goldman et al., 2011; Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003; Karpoff et al., 1999; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). In this study, we are 
interested in whether directors with political connections are expected to provide similar 
benefits to their firms in the political and business environment in Australia.      
This study makes a number of contributions, relevant to academic research and 
practitioners. We are the first to examine the prevalence of former politicians as corporate 
directors in Australia. In our sample of 1,561 ASX-listed companies in 2007, we find a 
total of 84 directorships held by 59 former politicians in 83 companies. This includes 26 
directorships held by 18 former federal politicians (prime minister, ministers and 
members of parliament), 40 directorships held by 24 former state politicians (premiers, 
ministers and members of parliament), 8 directorships held by 7 former local politicians 
(mayors and councillors) and 10 directorships held by former foreign politicians (from 
Botswana, Mexico, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
United Kingdom and United States).  
 4 
We extend prior studies on board composition in Australia by examining which 
types of companies have former politicians on their boards. Based on prior international 
studies, we expect that former politicians are more likely to be on the boards of firms in 
government-related industries (as they may assist with government negotiations and 
obtaining government contracts), firms with more debt (as they may facilitate access to 
credit) and bigger firms (as they may assist with the more intensive political oversight of 
larger firms). We find that former politicians are more likely to be found on the boards of 
companies with more debt, but not in bigger firms or in government-related industries.  
We examine the market reaction to the appointment of former politicians to 
determine whether shareholders value the expertise that former politicians bring to 
corporate boards in Australia. We find there is generally an insignificant market reaction 
to the appointment of former politicians, but the market reaction for former politicians is 
significantly lower than for non-politicians. This is inconsistent with the positive market 
reaction found in most prior international studies and indicates that shareholders do not 
value the expertise that former politicians bring to corporate boards in Australia. Further 
analysis shows that this is particularly the case when their political parties are not in 
power and when they have less political and director experience. 
From an international perspective we provide new evidence on two dimensions of 
political connections. We specifically focus on directorships held by former elected 
politicians. Prior studies have used a broader definition of politically-connected directors 
that also includes individuals with experience in government administration, government 
agencies, ambassadors, employees of political parties and election campaign staff 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Goldman et al., 2009). Our results indicate that 
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shareholders react negatively to the appointment of former elected politicians as directors. 
In addition, we are the first to focus on political connections in the political and business 
environment in Australia. We find no evidence of valuable political connections in 
Australia, a market where there is public funding of election campaigns and low levels of 
political lobbying and corruption.  
 
Politics in Australia 
There are three levels of government in Australia. The federal government is a 
constitutional parliamentary democracy with Australian citizens electing parliamentarians 
to the federal parliament, which includes both a House of Representatives and a Senate. 
The party or coalition of parties that controls the majority of seats in the House of 
Representatives forms the government, appoints Ministers from their elected 
parliamentarians and their party leader is the Prime Minister of Australia. The political 
systems of Australia’s six states and two territories are structured in a similar way to the 
federal government. Five of the six states have their own bicameral parliaments. Only the 
state of Queensland and the two territories have unicameral parliaments. Premiers are the 
heads of the state parliaments (Chief Minister in the two Territories). Local governments 
are the third tier of government and consist of elected councillors. Mayors are the heads 
of local governments. The main political parties in Australia are the Australian Labor 
Party, Liberal Party of Australia and National Party of Australia. In most jurisdictions 
these latter two parties co-operate and are known as the Coalition.  
 Australia is a developed country, with a common law legal origin and scores 
highly on World Bank governance indicators – rule of law (96.2 percentile), regulatory 
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quality (96.7 percentile), control of corruption (96.7 percentile) and government 
effectiveness (95.3 percentile). These measures compare favourably to those of the 
United States (91.1, 91.9, 85.8 and 88.6).
2
 Based on World Bank statistics, Australia’s 
government expenditure is 26.2 percent of GDP, relative to 25.9 percent for the US. 
Australia has similar restrictions on the share ownership and directorships of politicians 
to the United States (Faccio, 2006). Politicians are not allowed to hold corporate 
directorships while in office and must disclose their share ownership and changes in 
share ownership during their terms in office.  
One major difference between politics in Australia and the United States, however, 
is the reliance of political candidates and parties in the United States on private funding. 
Since 1984, elections have been at least partially funded by the government in Australia, 
with candidates and parties polling at least 4 percent of the primary vote receiving $2.31 
per vote in the 2010 federal election (13,131,667 votes were cast). Political parties in 
Australia also receive private donations, with the federal Labor and Liberal parties 
receiving $37 million and $30 million in 2010-2011.
3
 However, this hardly compares to 
the estimated US$2.38 billion raised from private donors by the Democrat and 
Republican presidential candidates for the US presidential election in 2012.
4
 Political 
lobbying is also substantially greater in the United States. In 2012, US$2.45 billion was 
spent on lobbying in the United States by a total of 12,016 registered lobbyists.
5
 In 
                                                 
2  These measures are from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project 
(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp). We use the United States as a reference due to the 
abundance of research on political connections in the US. 
3 Data sourced from the Australian Electoral Commission (www.aec.gov.au)  
4 According to: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/campaign-finance/ 
5 Data from the Center for Responsive Politics: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php  
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Australia, there were a total of 612 lobbyists registered on the Federal Register of 
Lobbyists in 2012.
6
  
 
Literature review and hypotheses 
In Australia, board of director research has predominantly focused on the independence 
and monitoring role of directors, motivated by the introduction of new corporate 
governance guidelines in the past decade (Aldamen et al., 2012; Balatbat et al., 2004; 
Christensen et al., 2010; Cotter and Silvester, 2003; Wang and Oliver, 2009). Some 
studies have examined other director characteristics, such as multiple directorships, 
director experience and gender. Kiel and Nicholson (2006) examine the prevalence of 
multiple directorships in ASX-listed companies in 2003 and find no relationship between 
multiple directorships and firm performance. Gray and Nowland (2013) investigate 
whether prior director experience is valued by shareholders and find a significant positive 
market reaction to the appointment of the most experienced directors. Adams et al. (2011) 
examine the gender of new director appointees and find the market reaction to the 
appointment of female directors is significantly higher than male directors.
7
  
A number of international studies have investigated the role political connections 
play in business. While there are a number of ways to potentially identify political 
connections, e.g. board connections, human ties and geographic ties, we focus on board 
connections in this paper as our data allows us to specifically identify corporate directors 
with prior experience as politicians. This approach has been previously used in cross-
                                                 
6 Data sourced from: http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/who_register.cfm  
7 International studies have also investigated other director characteristics, such as CEO experience, legal 
expertise, banking expertise, supply-chain experience and busyness (Dass et al., 2010; Ferris et al., 2003; 
Fich, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Guner et al., 2008; Krishnan et al., 2011). See Yermack (2006) for 
a review of the literature.  
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country studies (Faccio, 2006; Faccio, 2010) and studies of U.S. firms (e.g. Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 2001; Goldman et al., 2009; Hillman, 2005).  
 Prior studies have examined political connections as they are expected to provide 
benefits to firms. From a theoretical perspective, Hillman (2005) explains that directors 
with political experience can help firms to better understand the public policy process, 
provide a direct channel to existing politicians, bureaucrats and decision makers that may 
result in influence over political decisions, and provide legitimacy by associating their 
reputation and status with the firm. From an empirical perspective, Agrawal and Knoeber 
(2001) and Goldman et al. (2011) both show that firms with political connections receive 
preferential treatment in the award of government contracts. Faccio et al. (2006) find that 
politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out during economic crises. 
Several studies across different markets also show that firms with political connections 
gain preferential access to credit (Backman, 2001; Claessens et al., 2008; Cull and Xu, 
2005; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005).  
 This leads to the first research question examined in this study – which types of 
Australian firms have former politicians on their boards? If firms can potentially benefit 
from having former politicians on their boards, then we would expect that former 
politicians are not randomly distributed across firms. Prior research suggests three factors 
related to the existence of politically-connected directors – closeness to government, 
leverage and firm size.  
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) show that firms with more dealings with 
government (e.g. firms in regulated industries, firms with government contracts, firms 
that lobby government) are more likely to have politically-connected directors on their 
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boards. Hillman (2005) shows that firms in more regulated industries (e.g. 
telecommunications, biotechnology, tobacco, alcohol and gambling) have more politician 
directors. Since data on government contracts and political lobbying is not readily 
available in Australia, we focus our attention on industries that are more closely regulated 
by the government. Based on prior research and the specific business environment in 
Australia, we identify the banking, utilities, telecommunication, pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology, and media industries as being subject to greater regulation.
8
 We therefore 
expect to find more former politicians on the boards of companies in these industries. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms in regulated industries are more likely to have former 
politicians on their boards. 
Numerous prior studies find that political connections facilitate access to external 
credit (Backman, 2001; Cull and Xu, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Johnson and Mitton, 
2003). Faccio (2010) also shows that firms with political connections across 47 countries 
have higher leverage ratios. This indicates that firms with greater debt financing needs 
are more likely to have directors with political connections on their boards. We test this 
in the Australian context. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with higher leverage are more likely to have former 
politicians on their boards. 
Finally, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) propose that bigger firms, due to their 
greater market share and/or more diverse operations, are more likely to face intensive 
political oversight and encounter situations where political connections may be useful. 
                                                 
8 The banking, utilities, telecommunication and pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries have been 
identified in prior studies. We also include the media industry due to the strict ownership restrictions in 
Australia. We do not include the food, beverage and tobacco industry as it is a very diverse industry that 
includes firms that are both likely and unlikely to be subject to government regulation. Including it has no 
affect on the reported results. 
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Consistent with this expectation, they find that bigger firms have more directors with 
political experience. We therefore expect to find more former politicians on the boards of 
bigger companies.  
Hypothesis 3: Bigger firms are more likely to have former politicians on 
their boards. 
 Another area of study on political connections examines whether political 
connections provide a net benefit or cost to shareholders. The majority of the evidence to 
date suggests that shareholders can benefit from political connections. Faccio (2006) and 
Goldman et al. (2009) both find positive announcement effects when firms announce the 
nomination of politically connected individuals to their boards. Kim et al. (2012) show 
that stock returns are higher for firms that are geographically closer to regions of higher 
political power. Cooper et al. (2010) find a positive relationship between political 
contributions and future firm performance.
9
  
 This leads to the second research question examined in this study – do 
shareholders value the expertise that former politicians bring to corporate boards in 
Australia? To investigate this issue we use event study methodology rather than panel 
analysis. While both methodologies could be used to examine the relationship between 
directors with political experience and firm value, we believe that event studies are a 
cleaner measure of valuation effects. In particular, using an event study allows us to 
identify clean announcement events where the only news is the appointment of a new 
                                                 
9 Not every study has found a significant relationship. Fisman et al. (2006) find that the value of firms’ 
political ties to the former U.S. Vice-President Cheney are insignificant. Fan et al. (2007) show that the 
post-IPO performance of Chinese firms with politically-connected CEOs is significantly lower than other 
firms. 
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director, which reduces endogeneity concerns inherent in panel analysis, such as reverse 
causality and omitted variable bias.  
Prior work using this methodology, by Goldman et al. (2009) in the United States 
and Faccio (2006) covering 48 countries, indicates that shareholders react positively to 
the appointment of directors with political connections. These studies, however, examine 
the market reaction to the appointment of new directors using only univariate analysis. In 
our analysis we undertake both univariate and multivariate analysis. Univariate analysis 
allows us to examine the magnitude and sign of the market reaction to the appointment of 
former politicians as directors. Multivariate analysis allows us to determine the 
incremental effect of political expertise, i.e. if the market reaction to the appointment of 
former politicians is higher than for non-politicians, while controlling for other director 
characteristics (e.g. independence, experience, gender) and firm characteristics (e.g. firm 
size, performance) that have been found by prior studies to be related to the market 
reaction at the appointment of new directors (Adams et al., 2011; Ferris et al., 2003; Fich, 
2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Gray and Nowland, 2013; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; 
Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Consistent with the findings of prior research, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive market reaction to the appointment of 
former politicians as non-executive directors. 
In addition, it appears that the benefits of political connections are directly related 
to the strength of the political connection. We examine this from two dimensions – 
whether the politician’s political party is in power and the political experience of the 
appointee. Fisman (2001) shows that firms experience negative returns when their 
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political connections weaken. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) explain that firms 
connected to the former government in Indonesia had difficulty establishing connections 
with the new government after their connections lost political power. We therefore 
differentiate between former politicians whose political parties are and aren’t in power at 
the time of appointment. We expect a positive market reaction to the appointment of 
former politicians whose political parties are still in power (strong political connections) 
and an insignificant market reaction to the appointment of former politicians whose 
parties are not in power (weak or non-existent political connections). 
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive (insignificant) market reaction to the 
appointment of former politicians whose political parties are in power 
(not in power). 
The strength of political connections is also expected to be related to the political 
experience of the former politicians. Recent studies show that the strength of political 
connections is positively related to the years of experience in office of politically-
connected directors. Houston et al. (2012) find that the cost of bank loans to politically-
connected firms is negatively related to the political tenure of politician directors. Kim et 
al. (2013) show that audit pricing is positively related to the political experience of 
politician directors. We therefore expect a higher market reaction for appointees with 
more years of experience in political office.  
Hypothesis 6: The market reaction is higher for former politicians who 
have more political experience. 
 
Data 
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Sample 
To examine the prevalence of former politicians as corporate directors in Australia, our 
initial sample comprises all directors and firms available from the Boardroom database 
from Connect4 in 2007. After removing repeat observations, executive directors and 
alternate directors, our initial sample includes 6,162 non-executive directorships in 1,561 
ASX-listed companies.
10
 We then analyze director biographies in annual reports for each 
director to identify which directors are former politicians, i.e. have previously held an 
elected political office. Former politicians are identified through their reporting of 
previous experience as prime minister, minister, member of parliament, premier, mayor, 
councillor or politician in their biographies in annual reports. Other director and hiring 
board data is hand collected from annual reports and internet searches. 
 Table 1, Panel A provides details of the number and type of former politicians 
with directorships in ASX-listed companies. We find a total of 84 directorships held by 
59 former politicians in 83 companies. This includes 26 directorships held by 18 former 
federal politicians (prime minister, ministers and members of parliament), 40 
directorships held by 24 former state politicians (premiers, ministers and members of 
parliament), 8 directorships held by 7 former local politicians (mayors and councillors) 
and 10 directorships held by former foreign politicians (from Botswana, Mexico, 
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom and 
United States). Of these directorships, 9 are in the financial sector, 20 in the resource 
sector and 54 in the industrial sector. Non-politicians hold 6,078 directorships by 4,515 
                                                 
10 Only positions labelled as “Non Executive Director”, “Chairman” and Deputy Chairman” are retained as 
non-executive directors. We limit our analysis to non-executive directors to be consistent with prior 
research. We only find an additional 2 former politicians as executive directors.  
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unique individuals in 1,561 companies. This indicates that former politicians hold 
directorships in 5.32 percent (83/1,561) of our sample of ASX-listed companies. 
 To analyze which types of companies have former politicians on their boards, we 
merge this initial sample with firm financial data from the Aspect database. This reduces 
our sample to 68 companies with a former politician on their board and 1,181 companies 
without a former politician on their board. Table 1, Panel B shows the distribution of 
former politicians in this cross-sectional sample. There are a total of 69 directorships held 
by 50 former politicians and 4,940 directorships held by 4,016 non-politicians. In essence, 
the initial sample of firms and directorships has been reduced by about 20 percent. 
 We also utilize an appointment sample to examine the market reaction to the 
appointment of former politicians as directors, relative to the appointment of non-
politicians. This appointment sample starts with all new non-executive appointments to 
ASX-listed companies from the Boardroom database from Connect4 between 1 January 
2004 and 30 June 2011. We then remove observations where we could not confirm the 
announcement date of the appointment on the ASX Company Announcement database, 
where the director is not new to the company, where other news was announced during 
the period from the day before to the day after the appointment announcement, where 
there were multiple appointment announcements on the same day and where insufficient 
share price and financial data is available from the Sirca and Aspect databases. These 
restrictions limit our sample to interim appointments, those not voted on at annual general 
meetings, which reduce the likelihood that the appointments were anticipated by the 
market.
11
 This appointment sample includes 16 appointments of 14 unique former 
                                                 
11 As interim appointments are made by the board there is less chance for the market to anticipate this news. 
In contrast, appointments conducted at the annual general meeting of shareholders require the company to 
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politicians to 15 companies and 972 appointments of 924 unique non-politicians to 676 
companies, as displayed in Table 1, Panel C. 
 
Variables 
For convenience, definitions of all variables used in our analysis are provided in this 
section. Age is the age of former politicians in years (as at 2007). Years in office is the 
number of years former politicians held their elected offices. Years left office is the 
number of years since former politicians left their offices (up to 2007). Years as director 
is the number of years former politicians have held listed company directorships. No. 
other directorships is the number of other listed company directorships held by the 
director. Experience2+ is a dummy variable equal to one if directors have two or more 
other listed company directorships. Female is a dummy variable equal to one for female 
directors. LLB, MBA and PHD are dummy variables equal to one if directors hold these 
qualifications. Party in power is a dummy variable equal to one if the former politician’s 
political party is in power.
12
 Party – Liberal, Labor, National and Other are dummy 
variables equal to one for former Australian politicians who represented these political 
parties. State – NSW, QLD, VIC, WA, SA, NT and TAS are dummy variables equal to for 
former Australian politicians from these particular states or territory.   
 Dummy variables are used to identify firms with a former politician (politician) 
and various types of politicians ( federal, state, local and foreign) on their boards, firms 
                                                                                                                                                 
circulate the list of director candidates in advance, which provides the market with information about 
potential new appointments before voting to elect the candidates takes place.  
12  To identify if a politician’s political party is in power, we compare the political party the 
director/appointee previously represented to the party of the prime minister for former federal politicians, to 
the party of the respective state premier for former state and local politicians and to the party of the 
respective president/prime minister for former foreign politicians.   
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in industries that are identified as more regulated (regulated industries) and firms in the 
financial, resource and industrial sectors (financial sector, resource sector, industrial 
sector). Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Total assets is total assets measured 
in billions of Australian dollars. Return on assets is net income divided by total assets. 
Market-to-book is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. These 
financial ratios are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Board size is the number of 
directors on the board. Board independence is the proportion of independent directors on 
the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman.  
 In our appointment analysis, three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs(-1,+1)) 
around the appointment announcement are calculated following the standard event study 
methodology of Dodd and Warner (1983). Market model parameters are estimated from 
250 trading days to 20 trading days prior to the announcement date. Cumulative abnormal 
returns are calculated as actual returns less estimated returns based on the market 
model.
13
 A dummy variable, Politicians, identifies appointees that have previously held 
an elected political office. This is also separated into politicians whose political party is 
currently in power (Politicians – party in power), politicians whose political party is 
currently not in power (Politicians – party not in power), politicians who have at least 
two other directorships in listed companies (Politicians – with Experience2+) and 
politicians who have one or no other directorships in listed companies (Politicians – 
without Experience2+). Non-politician appointees generally have expertise as academics, 
bankers, consultants, doctors, engineers, executives, financial experts, lawyers and 
scientists.  
                                                 
13 We also estimate cumulative abnormal returns using actual returns less average firm returns over the 
estimation period (250 trading days to 20 trading days prior to the announcement date) and actual returns 
less market returns with consistent results.   
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Dummy variables identify whether the appointee has two or more other 
directorships in listed companies (Experience2+), the highest qualification of the 
appointee – doctoral degree (PHD), Master of Business Administration (MBA), other 
Master degree (MAS), law degree (LLB), other bachelor degree (BA) and no reported 
degree – the gender of the appointee (Female), the independence of the appointee 
(Independent), whether the appointee holds shares in the hiring firm (Equity), whether the 
appointment is to a new board seat (New seat) rather than replacing a departing director, 
whether there is an interlocking relationship between the appointee and a director on the 
hiring board (Interlocking), whether the CEO is involved in the selection of the new 
appointee (CEO involved), whether the hiring board is comprised of a majority of 
independent directors (Independent board), whether the appointment announcement was 
made before (Announcement before start date) or after (Announcement after start date) 
the date the director started their directorship and whether the firm is not traded each day 
in the 2-month trading period around the appointment announcement (Thin trading). 
Continuous variables indicate the tenure of the hiring firm CEO (CEO tenure), a 
herfindahl index of the occupation diversity of the hiring board (Occupation diversity), a 
herfindahl index of the degree diversity of the hiring board (Degree diversity) and the 
proportion of female directors on the hiring board (Gender diversity).
14
  
 
Empirical analysis 
Characteristics of former politicians 
                                                 
14  The herfindahl index for occupation diversity is the sum of squared proportions of the academics, 
bankers, consultants, doctors, engineers, executives, financial experts, lawyers, politicians and scientists on 
the hiring board. The herfindahl index for degree diversity is the sum of squared proportions of PHD, 
MBA, MAS, LLB, BA and no degree holders on the hiring board.   
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Table 2 describes the characteristics of the 59 former politicians that held non-executive 
directorships in our sample of ASX-listed companies in 2007. Panel A shows that the 
average former politician is 62.53 years old, spent 13.47 years in an elected political 
office (range 1-33 years) and left political office 8.20 years ago. They have an average of 
3.47 years of experience as a listed company director (range 0-15 years) and an average 
of 0.42 other directorships in listed companies (range 0-4). A total of 4 out of 59 (7 
percent) have two or more directorships in other listed companies (Experience2+) and 2 
out of 59 (3 percent) are female. With respect to qualifications, 8 percent have law 
degrees, 2 percent have MBA degrees and 8 percent have doctoral degrees.  
 The former politician’s political party is in power in 39 percent of the sample. The 
former Australian (non-foreign) politicians come from the Liberal party (49 percent), 
Labor party (29 percent), National party (14 percent) and other parties or independents (8 
percent). With respect to geographical distribution, the former politicians are from New 
South Wales (29 percent), Queensland (20 percent), Victoria (20 percent), Western 
Australia (14 percent), South Australia (10 percent), Northern Territory (4 percent) and 
Tasmania (2 percent).  
 To determine if politician and non-politician directors differ in other ways (other 
than their political experience), Table 2 Panel B tests for differences in some identifiable 
characteristics. The tests indicate that the directorships held by former politicians are 
more likely to be independent and that politicians are less likely to hold MBA degrees. 
There are no significant differences in the other variables, including gender and other 
directorships. This indicates that certain other characteristics need to be controlled for in 
order to specifically examine the effect of political connections.  
 19 
 In untabulated descriptive statistics for the 16 former politician appointees in the 
appointment sample, we find that the average former politician appointee has 14.25 years 
experience in political office, left office 3.50 years ago, has 1.13 other listed company 
directorships and 1.50 years experience as a listed company director. A total of 7 out of 
16 former politician appointee’s political parties are in power, 4 out of 16 have two or 
more directorships in other listed companies and 1 out of 16 are female. The Appendix 
provides additional details. 
 
Former politicians, industry and firm characteristics 
In this section, we use our cross-sectional sample of 1,249 companies in 2007 to examine 
which types of firms have former politicians on their boards. We hypothesize that firms 
in regulated industries, firms with higher leverage and bigger firms are more likely to 
have former politicians on their boards. We also control for relationships between return 
on assets, market-to-book ratios, board size, board independence and CEO duality on the 
presence of former politicians on boards.  
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and univariate tests of industry and firm 
characteristics for companies with and without former politicians on their boards. With 
respect to industry, we identify the banking, utilities, telecommunication, 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, and media industries as being subject to greater 
regulation than other industries. However, we find that 12 percent of firms with former 
politicians are in regulated industries, which is insignificantly different to the 11 percent 
of firms without former politicians on their boards. As an alternative test for industry 
differences, we also examine the three main industry sectors in Australia – financial, 
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resource and industrial sectors. These results indicate that former politicians are more 
likely to be on the boards of companies in the industrial sector and less likely to be on the 
boards of companies in the resource sector. There is no significant difference for the 
financial sector.  
 With respect to leverage, we find that companies with former politicians on their 
boards have higher mean (0.44 versus 0.32) and median (0.44 versus 0.26) leverage ratios. 
For firm size, we find that median total assets is larger for companies with former 
politicians on their boards. There is no significant difference in mean total assets. 
Examining other firm characteristics we find that firms with former politicians on their 
boards have bigger and more independent boards. There are no significant differences in 
return on assets, market-to-book ratios and the incidence of CEO duality.  
 In Table 4 we relate the presence of former politicians on boards to these industry 
and firm characteristics using a probit model. Two specifications are presented for each 
variable due to the two types of industry variables. All models include robust standard 
errors. In the first two specifications, we find that the presence of former politicians is 
insignificantly different in regulated industries. But, former politicians are less likely to 
be found in firms in the financial and resource sectors (more likely in the industrial sector) 
and are more likely to be found in firms with higher leverage and in firms with bigger 
boards. These results are consistent with the results from Table 3 and confirm that former 
politicians are more likely to hold directorships in firms with higher leverage (supporting 
Hypothesis 2).  Former politicians are not more prevalent in regulated industries (no 
support for Hypothesis 1), but are more prevalent in firms in the industrial sector. We 
find no support for Hypothesis 3, in that former politicians are not more likely to be on 
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the boards of bigger firms. However, we do find that former politicians hold more 
directorships in firms that have bigger boards, which is likely due to the greater number 
of board seats available in these companies.  
 The remaining specifications in Table 4 show the analysis for former federal, state, 
local and foreign politicians. We find that former federal politicians are more likely to 
hold directorships in companies with higher leverage, smaller companies and companies 
with bigger and more independent boards, and are less likely to hold directorships in 
companies in the resource sector. Former state politicians are more likely to hold 
directorships in companies with higher leverage. Former local politicians are more likely 
to hold directorships in companies with more independent boards. These results are 
generally consistent with those for all former politicians.  
The results in specifications nine and ten for former foreign politicians are 
different. We find that former foreign politicians are more likely to hold directorships in 
companies in the resource sector and in companies with bigger but less independent 
boards. These results suggest that firms that have former foreign politicians on their 
boards are different to firms that have other former politicians on their boards. In 
particular, these results suggest that former foreign politicians are predominantly used by 
mining companies to assist them with their foreign mining operations.  
  
Former politicians and firm value 
In this section, we examine the relationship between former politician directors and firm 
value by investigating the market reaction to the appointment of former politicians as 
corporate directors. This analysis is conducted on our appointment sample, which is 
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comprised of 16 appointments of politicians and 972 appointments of non-politicians to 
ASX-listed company boards over the period 2004 to 2011. The Appendix provides details 
of the 16 politician director appointments. 
 Table 5 displays the mean and median announcement CARs(-1,+1) for former 
politicians and non-politicians. The mean (median) CARs for former politicians are -1.40 
percent (-1.24 percent) relative to 0.69 percent (0.05 percent) for non-politicians. The 
mean and median differences of -2.09 percent and -1.29 percent are not statistically 
significant. The remainder of Table 5 also indicates that the market reaction to different 
types of former politicians is insignificantly different from zero and there are no 
significant differences between the market reaction to these different types of former 
politicians and non-politicians. This may be due to the small sample of former politician 
directors or due to other omitted variables which are also related to the announcement 
CARs. While it is difficult to increase our sample size, due to the infrequent appointment 
of former politician directors, we can control for other factors identified by prior studies 
as related to appointment announcement CARs. 
 Previous studies have found that director experience or busyness (holding two or 
more directorships in other listed companies) is related to the market reaction at 
appointment of new directors (Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Gray and 
Nowland, 2013). Fich (2005) relates the market reaction at appointment to the 
qualifications of appointees, e.g. MBA and law degrees. Adams et al. (2011) find the 
market reaction to the appointment of female directors is significantly higher than male 
directors. Other studies show that variables, such as director independence, interlocking 
directorships, CEO involvement, board diversity, firm size, firm performance, growth 
 23 
prospects, industry factors, the timeliness of announcements and thin trading, are also 
related to announcement CARs (Adams et al., 2011; DeFond et al., 2005; Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Accordingly, we include 11 appointee and 
15 firm control variables to control for these influences. 
 Table 6 presents the results of our multivariate analysis of the announcement 
CARs. In the first specification we include firm control variables and find the coefficient 
on Politicians is -2.21 (t=-1.66, p<0.1). In the second specification we include appointee 
control variables and find the coefficient on Politicians is -2.02 (t=-1.68, p<0.1). In the 
third specification we include both appointee and firm controls and the coefficient on 
Politicians is -2.20 (t=-1.78, p<0.1). These results indicate that on average, the market 
reaction to the announcement of former politician appointees is 2.20 percent lower than 
the market reaction to other appointees (Hypothesis 4 is not supported). 
Of the control variables, the coefficient on Experience2+ is positive, which is 
consistent with shareholders valuing prior director experience (Gray and Nowland, 2013). 
The coefficient on Equity is positive, which is consistent with the findings of Swan and 
Honeine (2011). The coefficient on Thin trading is positive, which indicates a higher 
magnitude of returns for thinly traded firms. The coefficient on Financial sector is 
negative, indicating a smaller announcement effect for financial firms. 
 In the fourth specification we test Hypothesis 5 by differentiating between 
appointees whose former political party is and isn’t in power at the time of appointment. 
We find that the coefficient on Politicians – party not in power is -3.26 (t=-2.06, p<0.05) 
and the coefficient on Politicians – party in power is -0.86 (t=-0.47). This indicates that 
the market reaction is significantly negative only for former politician appointees whose 
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parties are currently not in power. The market reaction to appointees whose parties are 
currently in power is insignificantly different to other appointees. In both cases 
Hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
 In the fifth specification we test Hypothesis 6 by interacting the politicians 
dummy variable with the number of years of political experience of former politicians 
(Politicians x Years in office). We find that the coefficient on this interaction term is 0.68 
(t=4.23, p<0.01). This supports Hypothesis 6 and indicates that the market reaction is 
higher for former politicians with more political experience. However, the coefficient on 
Politicians is -11.94 (t=-5.87, p<0.01), which shows that the market reacts negatively to 
former politicians with less political experience.  
 Overall, however, our results are inconsistent with prior studies that find a 
positive market reaction to the appointment of politically-connected directors in the 
United States and around the world (Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al., 2009). Our results 
indicate that shareholders do not believe that former politicians in Australia bring 
significant benefits, in the form of valuable political connections, to their directorships on 
corporate boards.  
 There are two potential explanations for our results – our definition of politician 
directors or the political and business environment in Australia. Since our sample 
includes only former elected politicians, it is possible that the benefits and costs of former 
elected politicians are different to other politically-connected directors. Our results 
indicate that the market reaction is higher for politician directors with more political 
experience, but the average market reaction is negative. This suggests any benefits of 
political connections are being overshadowed by other negative effects. For example, it is 
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likely that the former elected politicians in our sample have less business experience than 
the politically-connected directors in prior studies. Since the career goal of former elected 
politicians was to obtain a political office, they are likely to have limited business 
experience and little or no prior experience as a company director. This is important as 
prior studies show that the market reaction to the appointment of new directors is higher 
for appointees with prior CEO and director experience (Fich, 2005; Gray and Nowland, 
2013).  
 In specification six, we examine this possibility by differentiating between former 
politicians that have and don’t have significant experience as a director – two or more 
other directorships in listed companies. The coefficient on Politicians – without 
Experience2+ is -2.93 (t=-1.93, p<0.10) and indicates that the market reaction is 
significantly lower for former politicians who have limited or no prior experience as a 
corporate director. The coefficient on Politicians – with Experience2+ is 0.00 (t=0.01) 
and indicates that the market reaction to former politicians with significant experience as 
a corporate director is no different in magnitude to the market reaction to non-politicians 
with significant experience as a corporate director (Experience2+). These results suggest 
that shareholders react negatively to former politicians with limited or no prior 
experience as a corporate director. However, once these former politicians have gained 
significant experience as a corporate director, the market reaction to their appointment is 
the same as for other experienced directors. In both cases, however, there is no evidence 
that former politicians bring incremental benefits to shareholders in the form of valuable 
political connections. 
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 The second potential explanation for our results is the political and business 
environment in Australia. Our results suggest that former elected politicians are not able 
to capitalize on their political connections to create value for shareholders in Australia. 
This could be because relationships between business and politics are weaker in Australia 
than other markets, such as the United States. In Australia, government elections are at 
least partially funded by public funds, reducing the reliance of political parties on private 
donations and any potential favours expected from contributing companies and 
individuals, i.e. politicians have lower rent-seeking incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994). Political lobbying is also much weaker in Australia, relative to the United States. 
In addition, World Bank indicators show that Australia scores better in its control of 
corruption (96.7 percentile) than the United States (85.8 percentile). These factors 
contribute to the political and business environment in Australia, where our results 
indicate that political connections are not valuable to companies and their shareholders.  
 
Conclusions 
In this study we investigate the existence and value of director-level political connections 
in Australia. We examine the prevalence of former politicians as directors in ASX-listed 
companies, the types of companies they hold directorships in and the market reaction to 
their appointment. In our sample of 1,561 companies in 2007, we find that former federal, 
state, local and foreign politicians hold directorships in 5.32 percent of firms. Former 
politicians are more likely to hold directorships in firms with more debt, bigger boards 
and in the industrial sector. These results are generally consistent for former federal, state 
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and local politicians, but not for foreign politicians. This suggests that there may be 
different motivations for firms to add domestic versus foreign politicians to their boards. 
 In our analysis of the market reaction to the appointment of new directors, we find 
no evidence that political connections are valuable in Australia. We find that shareholders 
react negatively to the appointment of former politicians as directors (relative to non-
politicians), especially if their parties are not in power and they have less political and 
director experience. If their parties are in power or if the appointee has substantial 
political or director experience, we find the market reaction is insignificantly different to 
other appointees. 
 This paper adds to the literature on board composition and firm value in Australia 
by being the first to examine which types of companies have directors with political 
expertise on their boards and the relationship between former politician directors and firm 
value. In addition, this paper contributes to the international literature on political 
connections by showing that not all politically-connected directors are expected to create 
value for shareholders. We find that shareholders react negatively to the appointment of 
former elected politicians as corporate directors in Australia, a market where there is 
public funding of election campaigns and low levels of political lobbying and corruption.  
 We acknowledge some limitations of our study, which are potential avenues for 
future research. First, our sample of ASX-listed companies in 2007 covers approximately 
90 percent of listed companies. This indicates that our analysis may underestimate the 
total number of former politician directors in all ASX-listed companies. Second, our 
appointment sample is relatively small due to the infrequent appointment of former 
politician directors. In addition, our appointment sample does not include the 
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appointment of any foreign politicians, which may be viewed differently by shareholders. 
Finally, our study focuses on former politicians who obtain directorships in ASX-listed 
companies. Former politicians also obtain directorships in non-listed government-
controlled entities and private firms, which are worthy of further investigation. 
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Appendix 
Details of politician director appointments 2004-2011 
 
Date CAR(-1,+1) Code Name Political Office Party 
22/2/2010 -9.56% FGI Jack Jacovou Local Councillor Liberal 
15/3/2006 -8.27% SEN Alan Stockdale State Minister Liberal 
27/4/2006 -8.24% GPN David Drewett Local Councillor Labor 
19/4/2005 -6.62% HGO John Quirke Federal MOP Labor 
31/1/2005 -4.87% CEG Robert Borbidge QLD Premier National 
27/6/2011 -3.36% SRV Mark Vaile Federal Minister National 
22/9/2006 -2.53% CEG Warren Entsch Federal MOP Liberal 
5/7/2004 -1.61% GRD Richard Court WA Premier Liberal 
1/2/2006 -0.87% API Michael Woolbridge Federal Minister Liberal 
30/7/2008 1.34% NHR Richard Court WA Premier Liberal 
20/2/2008 1.84% ARU Ian Laurance State Minister Liberal 
12/6/2007 2.45% ASZ Ian Campbell Federal Minister Liberal 
18/7/2007 2.79% PHK Pam Allan State Minister Labor 
11/3/2008 4.66% PRW Ian Campbell Federal Minister Liberal 
17/8/2007 4.84% MWR John Dawkins Federal Minister Labor 
24/1/2008 6.00% MTN Chris Schacht Federal Minister Labor 
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Table 1 
Former politicians as corporate directors 
 
Panel A – Initial sample (1,561 firms) 
 Financials Resources Industrials Total Individuals 
Federal      
 Prime Minister - - 1 1 1 
 Minister - 1 16 17 10 
 Member - 2 6 8 7 
State      
 Premier 4 2 9 15 7 
 Minister 5 7 11 23 15 
 Member - - 2 2 2 
Local      
 Mayor - 1 4 5 4 
 Councillor - 1 2 3 3 
Foreign      
 Botswana - 1 - 1 1 
 Mexico - 1 - 1 1 
 Philippines - 1 - 1 1 
 PNG - 1 - 1 1 
 Singapore - - 1 1 1 
 South Africa - 1 - 1 1 
 Spain - - 1 1 1 
 UK - 1 - 1 1 
 USA - - 2 2 2 
Politicians 9 20 54 84 59 
Non-politicians 1107 2184 2787 6078 4515 
 
Panel B – Cross-sectional sample (1,249 firms) 
 Financials Resources Industrials Total Individuals 
Federal      
 Prime Minister - - 1 1 1 
 Minister - 1 12 13 8 
 Member - 2 5 7 6 
State      
 Premier 3 2 8 13 7 
 Minister 4 6 9 19 13 
 Member - - 1 1 1 
Local      
 Mayor - 1 4 5 4 
 Councillor - - 2 2 2 
Foreign      
 Botswana - 1 - 1 1 
 Mexico - 1 - 1 1 
 PNG - 1 - 1 1 
 Singapore - - 1 1 1 
 Spain - - 1 1 1 
 UK - 1 - 1 1 
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 USA - - 2 2 2 
Politicians 7 16 46 69 50 
Non-politicians 826 1858 2256 4940 4016 
 
Panel C – Appointment sample (691 firms) 
 Financials Resources Industrials Total Individuals 
Federal      
 Minister 1 2 3 6 5 
 Member - 1 1 2 2 
State      
 Premier - - 3 3 2 
 Minister - 1 2 3 3 
Local      
 Councillor - 1 1 2 2 
Politicians 1 5 10 16 14 
Non-politicians 105 403 464 972 924 
 
 
This table displays the prevalence of former politicians as non-executive directors in ASX-listed companies. Panel A includes 
directorships in 1,561 firms in 2007 available from the Boardroom database from Connect4. Panel B includes directorships in 
1,249 firms in 2007 that also have firm financial data from Aspect. Panel C shows the appointment sample, which includes 988 
non-executive director appointments to 691 Australian Stock Exchange listed companies between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 
2011. Individuals is the number of unique individuals. 
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Table 2 
Characteristics of former politicians 
 
Panel A – Former politicians 
 Mean Median Min Max Std 
Age 62.53 62.00 46.00 81.00 7.34 
Years in office 13.47 13.00 1.00 33.00 7.03 
Years left office 8.20 8.00 0.00 22.00 5.53 
Years as director 3.47 3.00 0.00 15.00 2.88 
No. other directorships 0.42 0.00 0.00 4.00 0.79 
Experience2+ 0.07     
Female 0.03     
LLB 0.08     
MBA 0.02     
PHD 0.08     
Party in power 0.39     
Party – Liberal a 0.49     
Party – Labor a 0.29     
Party – National a 0.14     
Party – Other a 0.08     
State – NSW a 0.29     
State – QLD a 0.20     
State – VIC a 0.20     
State – WA a 0.14     
State – SA a 0.10     
State - NT a 0.04     
State – TAS a 0.02     
 
Panel B – Politicians versus Non-politicians 
 
Politicians 
(mean) 
Non-politicians 
(mean) 
Mean Test 
(t-statistic) 
Wilcoxon 
(z-statistic) 
Independence b 0.82 0.55 5.05*** 5.04*** 
No. other directorships 0.42 0.46 -0.28 -0.17 
Experience2+ 0.07 0.11 -0.93 -0.93 
Female 0.03 0.05 -0.58 -0.58 
LLB 0.08 0.10 -0.57 -0.57 
MBA 0.02 0.09 -1.94* -1.93* 
PHD 0.08 0.06 0.60 0.60 
 
This table displays the characteristics of former politicians in our initial sample of 1,561 ASX-listed companies in 2007. Panel A 
shows descriptive statistics of the 59 former politicians that hold non-executive directorships in the initial sample. Full descriptive 
statistics are only shown for continuous variables. Panel B shows means and differences in characteristics between the 59 former 
politicians and 4,515 non-politicians in the initial sample. Director data is sourced from company annual reports on the Connect4 
Annual Report database and from internet searches. See section 4.2 for variable definitions. Results of mean t-tests and Wilcoxon tests 
are displayed. Significance at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%. 
a 
indicates statistics for 49 Australian (non-foreign) politicians only. 
b 
indicates statistics at the directorship level (n = 84 politicians, 6078 non-politicians).  
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Table 3 
Industry and firm characteristics 
 
 Firms with Politician (n=68) Firms without Politician (n=1181) Mean Test 
(t-statistic) 
Wilcoxon 
(z-statistic)  Mean Median Min Max Std Mean Median Min Max Std 
Regulated industries 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.19 0.19 
Financial sector 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 -0.74 -0.74 
Resource sector 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 -3.55*** -3.53*** 
Industrial sector 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 4.10*** 4.07*** 
Leverage 0.44 0.44 0.01 1.00 0.24 0.32 0.26 0.01 1.00 0.27 3.71*** 4.19*** 
Total Assets 4.76 0.08 0.01 115.01 17.69 2.42 0.03 0.01 564.63 26.40 0.72 2.49** 
Return on Assets (%) -6.26 4.33 -100.00 23.38 26.88 -9.90 -1.15 -100.00 82.32 30.38 0.97 1.48 
Market-to-book 3.37 2.39 0.10 10.00 2.49 3.48 2.49 0.10 10.00 2.84 -0.31 0.27 
Board Size 6.76 6.00 3.00 17.00 2.62 5.67  5.00 3.00 15.00 2.09 4.12*** 3.82*** 
Board Independence 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.85 0.24 0.37 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.28 2.14** 2.19** 
CEO duality 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 -0.09 -0.07 
 
This table displays industry and firm characteristics of firms with and without a former politician on their board in our cross-sectional sample. The sample comprises 1,249 Australian Stock Exchange 
listed companies in 2007 that are available from Boardroom from Connect4 and have financial data available from Aspect. Board data is sourced from company annual reports on the Connect4 Annual 
Report database. Industry and firm financial data is from Aspect. See section 4.2 for variable definitions. Results of mean t-tests and Wilcoxon tests are displayed. Significance at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 
1%. 
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Table 4 
Former politicians, industry and firm characteristics 
 
 Politician Federal State Local Foreign 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Intercept 
-2.34*** 
(-12.91) 
-2.07*** 
(-9.95) 
-2.70*** 
(-10.47) 
-2.44*** 
(-8.77) 
-2.27*** 
(-12.67) 
-2.15*** 
(-10.20) 
-3.62*** 
(-6.52) 
-3.46*** 
(-5.72) 
-3.63*** 
(-6.40) 
-4.08*** 
(-5.98) 
Regulated industries 
-0.12 
(-0.65) 
 
0.02 
(0.07) 
 
-0.40 
(-1.39) 
 
0.29 
(1.08) 
 
-0.19 
(-0.53) 
 
Financial sector  
-0.37* 
(-1.88) 
 n/a  
0.08 
(0.36) 
 n/a  n/a 
Resource sector  
-0.39** 
(-2.48) 
 
-0.50* 
(-1.90) 
 
-0.20 
(-0.99) 
 
-0.45 
(-1.11) 
 
0.73*** 
(2.63) 
Leverage 
0.66*** 
(3.08) 
0.44* 
(1.73) 
0.56*** 
(2.50) 
0.29 
(1.02) 
0.72*** 
(2.67) 
0.57* 
(1.84) 
0.28 
(0.46) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
-0.72 
(-0.82) 
-0.05 
(-0.06) 
Ln(Total Assets) 
-0.04 
(-0.95) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.11** 
(-1.97) 
-0.09 
(-1.62) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(-0.41) 
-0.02 
(-0.20) 
0.05 
(0.60) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
Return on Assets 
0.13 
(0.51) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.25 
(0.91) 
0.13 
(0.47) 
0.22 
(0.58) 
0.19 
(0.52) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(-0.21) 
0.18 
(0.40) 
0.54 
(0.90) 
Market-to-book 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
0.02 
(0.62) 
0.02 
(0.69) 
-0.01 
(-0.58) 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
-0.02 
(-0.39) 
-0.05 
(-0.86) 
Board Size 
0.09*** 
(2.82) 
0.07** 
(2.09) 
0.08* 
(1.69) 
0.06 
(1.31) 
0.03 
(0.82) 
0.02 
(0.65) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.23) 
0.19*** 
(5.38) 
0.21*** 
(5.57) 
Board Independence 
0.32 
(1.45) 
0.30 
(1.33) 
0.69** 
(2.13) 
0.66** 
(2.06) 
-0.06 
(-0.24) 
-0.09 
(-0.34) 
1.80*** 
(3.42) 
1.82*** 
(3.45) 
-0.72 
(-1.59) 
-0.84* 
(-1.78) 
CEO duality 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
0.06 
(0.19) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(-0.62) 
-0.19 
(-0.66) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.22 0.27 
n 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 
 
Probit models relate the presence of former politicians and different types of former politicians to industry and firm variables. The sample comprises 1,249 Australian Stock Exchange listed companies 
in 2007 that are available from Boardroom from Connect4 and have financial data available from Aspect. Board data is sourced from company annual reports on the Connect4 Annual Report database. 
Industry and firm financial data is from Aspect. See section 4.2 for variable definitions. Models include robust standard errors. z-statistics are in parentheses. Significance at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%. 
n/a indicates that a coefficient is not available due to no cross-sectional variation. 
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Table 5 
Former politicians and announcement CARs 
 
 n 
Mean 
 CARs (-1,+1) 
Median 
 CARs (-1,+1) 
(1) Non-Politicians 972 
0.69*** 
(2.63) 
0.05 
(1.27) 
(2) Politicians 16 
-1.40 
(-1.10) 
-1.24 
(-0.96) 
 Difference (2) – (1)  
-2.09 
(-1.02) 
-1.29 
(-0.96) 
(3) Politicians – party in power 7 
0.48 
(0.26) 
1.34 
(0.42) 
 Difference (3) – (1)  
-0.21 
(-0.07) 
1.29 
(0.36) 
(4) Politicians – party not in power 9 
-2.87 
(-1.69) 
-3.36 
(-1.42) 
 Difference (4) – (1)  
-3.56 
(-1.29) 
-3.41 
(-1.60) 
 
The table displays mean and median CARs (-1,+1) as a percentage (%) for former politicians and non-politicians, significance of 
CARs from zero and mean t-tests and Wilcoxon tests. The appointment sample comprises 988 non-executive director appointments to 
Australian Stock Exchange listed companies between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2011. Share price data is sourced from Sirca. See 
section 4.2 for variable definitions. Significance at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%. 
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Table 6 
Multivariate analysis of announcement CARs 
 
 CARs (-1,+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
1.71 
(0.91) 
1.28 
(1.47) 
1.91 
(0.93) 
1.90 
(0.92) 
1.90 
(0.92) 
1.93 
(0.94) 
Politicians 
-2.21* 
(-1.66) 
-2.02* 
(-1.68) 
-2.20* 
(-1.78) 
 
-11.94*** 
(-5.87) 
 
Politicians – party not in power    
-3.26** 
(-2.06) 
  
Politicians – party in power    
-0.86 
(-0.47) 
  
Politicians x Years in office     
0.68*** 
(4.23) 
 
Politicians – without Experience2+      
-2.93* 
(-1.93) 
Politicians – with Experience2+      
0.00 
(0.01) 
Experience2+  
1.23** 
(2.13) 
1.31** 
(2.35) 
1.30** 
(2.34) 
1.27** 
(2.28) 
1.24** 
(2.21) 
BA  
0.17 
(0.26) 
0.47 
(0.72) 
0.46 
(0.71) 
0.44 
(0.67) 
0.48 
(0.73) 
LLB  
-0.38 
(-0.42) 
-0.08 
(-0.09) 
-0.06 
(-0.07) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(-0.07) 
MAS  
-0.05 
(-0.05) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
MBA  
-0.53 
(-0.52) 
-0.64 
(-0.62) 
-0.65 
(-0.63) 
-0.64 
(-0.62) 
-0.65 
(-0.63) 
PHD  
0.39 
(0.42) 
0.25 
(0.28) 
0.27 
(0.29) 
0.19 
(0.21) 
0.27 
(0.30) 
Female  
-0.23 
(-0.37) 
0.22 
(0.35) 
0.20 
(0.32) 
0.19 
(0.31) 
0.23 
(0.37) 
Independent  
-1.23 
(-1.53) 
-0.80 
(-0.97) 
-0.80 
(-0.97) 
-0.83 
(-1.01) 
-0.81 
(-0.98) 
Equity  
1.68* 
(1.82) 
1.80* 
(1.94) 
1.79* 
(1.93) 
1.79* 
(1.94) 
1.81* 
(1.95) 
New Seat  
-0.18 
(-0.37) 
-0.28 
(-0.57) 
-0.26 
(-0.52) 
-0.26 
(-0.53) 
-0.29 
(-0.59) 
Interlocking  
0.15 
(0.11) 
0.38 
(0.29) 
0.36 
(0.27) 
0.48 
(0.37) 
0.41 
(0.32) 
CEO involved 
-0.10 
(-0.17) 
 
-0.05 
(-0.08) 
-0.06 
(-0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
-0.07 
(-0.11) 
CEO tenure 
-0.07 
(-1.61) 
 
-0.07 
(-1.51) 
-0.06 
(-1.49) 
-0.07 
(-1.57) 
-0.07 
(-1.51) 
CEO duality 
-0.81 
(-0.77) 
 
-0.84 
(-0.78) 
-0.79 
(-0.73) 
-0.89 
(-0.82) 
-0.85 
(-0.78) 
Independent board 
-0.48 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.36 
(-0.57) 
-0.34 
(-0.55) 
-0.36 
(-0.57) 
-0.35 
(-0.57) 
Occupation diversity 0.66  0.91 0.87 0.95 0.92 
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(0.48) (0.66) (0.63) (0.69) (0.67) 
Degree diversity 
-1.55 
(-1.11) 
 
-1.49 
(-1.05) 
-1.47 
(-1.03) 
-1.45 
(-1.02) 
-1.47 
(-1.03) 
Gender diversity 
3.22 
(1.35) 
 
3.37 
(1.39) 
3.41 
(1.40) 
3.35 
(1.38) 
3.30 
(1.36) 
Ln(Total Assets) 
-0.13 
(-0.74) 
 
-0.20 
(-1.11) 
-0.20 
(-1.10) 
-0.20 
(-1.10) 
-0.21 
(-1.12) 
Return on Assets 
-0.22 
(-0.16) 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
Market-to-book 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
Announcement before start date 
0.65 
(0.91) 
 
0.66 
(0.90) 
0.65 
(0.89) 
0.65 
(0.90) 
0.69 
(0.94) 
Announcement after start date 
-0.39 
(-0.56) 
 
-0.29 
(-0.41) 
-0.30 
(-0.43) 
-0.35 
(-0.51) 
-0.26 
(-0.37) 
Thin trading 
1.45** 
(2.56) 
 
1.44** 
(2.50) 
1.45** 
(2.52) 
1.46** 
(2.53) 
1.44** 
(2.49) 
Financial sector 
-1.35** 
(-2.29) 
 
-1.42** 
(-2.36) 
-1.41** 
(-2.34) 
-1.42** 
(-2.38) 
-1.44** 
(-2.40) 
Resource sector 
0.06 
(0.11) 
 
-0.16 
(-0.27) 
-0.16 
(-0.27) 
-0.14 
(-0.24) 
-0.15 
(-0.26) 
R2 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
n 988 988 988 988 988 988 
 
Regressions relate CARs (-1,+1) as a percentage (%) to politician and control variables. The appointment sample comprises 988 non-
executive director appointments to Australian Stock Exchange listed companies between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2011. Director and 
hiring board data is sourced from company annual reports on the Connect4 Annual Report database. Hiring firm financial data is from 
Aspect. Share price data is sourced from Sirca. See section 4.2 for variable definitions. Models include robust standard errors. t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Significance at * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
